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What kind of party is UKIP?  
The future of the extreme right in Britain or just another Tory party? 
 
 
This article aims to further our understanding of the nature of UKIP. Our approach differs from 
much of the existing literature on party families, by analysing public attitudes towards UKIP in 
FRPSDULVRQZLWKRWKHUSDUWLHV0XOWLGLPHQVLRQDOXQIROGLQJLVXWLOLVHGWRPDS8.,3¶VSODFHLn the 
%ULWLVKSDUW\V\VWHP7RELWUHJUHVVLRQVDUHHPSOR\HGWRFRPSDUH8.,3¶VVXSSRUWEDVHZLWKWKDW
of the BNP and the Conservatives and, finally, latent class analysis is used to assess the heteroge-
QHLW\LQ8.,3¶VVXSSRUWEDVH7KHFRQFOXVLRQLVWKDWZLWh increasing success, UKIP has estab-
lishing itself as the only viable electoral option for British extreme right voters while also making 
serious inroads into more traditional conservative circles, who are Eurosceptic but not extreme. 
This bridging position between the mainstream and the extreme makes UKIP distinctive from other 
British parties, and has parallels with the positions of anti-establishment, EU sceptical and immi-
gration-critical parties elsewhere in Europe. 
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Single-issue, mainstream or extreme right? 
 
Despite considerable electoral impact the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been largely over-
looked in the comparative literature. It is striking how much more attention has been paid to the 
much smaller British National Party (BNP), as a quick check on Google Scholar would show. The 
most plausible reason is that BNP has been treated as the only British extreme right party of inter-
est, with UKIP brushed aside as a single-issue oddity. An illustrative example is Roger Griffin 
(2007:246), who notes WKDW8.,3KDVPDGHPDQLIHVWRVWDWHPHQWVDERXWLPPLJUDWLRQZKLFK³ZRXOG
QRWEHRXWRISODFH´LQFRQWLQHQWDOQHR-populist parties, but still argues that the single-issue anti-
EU nature means that it cannot be classified into the same category as BNP (compare also John 
and Margetts 2009). More in-depth studies of UKIP also tend to play down its degree of radicalism. 
Ford and Goodwin (2014:7), for example, DUJXHWKDW%13DQG8.,3³DUHYHU\GLIIHUHQWSDUWLHV´
in terms of ideology as well as origin. To this can be added different patterns of international co-
operation (e.g. 0F*RZDQDQGWKHIDFWWKDW%13LVTXLWHRIWHQODEHOOHGDV³IDVFLVW´LQVHULRXV
scholarly work (e.g. Goodwin 2011; Copsey 2008), which is not the case with UKIP. 
 
That there are important differences between UKIP and BNP is quite clear. This, however, leaves 
the question about the nature of the former party unanswered. On its own, the distinctiveness from 
BNP does not preclude UKIP from being treated as a member of the broader, quite diverse, family 
of European far right parties. That the party cannot be dismissed as an irrelevance, or as a transi-
tional phenomenon, is increasingly clear. It has been represented in the EU parliament since 1999, 
it was the biggest UK party in the 2014 EU election and it received the third highest number of 
votes in the 2015 General Election. Even though the European Union membership referendum on 
23 June 2016 UHVXOWHGLQDPDMRULW\IRU³%UH[LW´LWFDQQRWEHDVVXPHGWKDWUKIP will disappear. 
 
To treat UKIP as a single-issue party may have been justifiable in its early years, but has become 
increasingly questionable. In the 2015 General Election UKIP produced a 76-page manifesto, cov-
ering a wide range of areas. Of course EU opposition is a key priority, but in addition the party 
wants to reduce taxes, repeal the Climate Change Act, increase the number of grammar schools, 
increase resources to the police, increase prison capacity, make convicted criminals serve their full 
sentences, introduce citizen initiatives and recall votes for Members of Parliament, etc. Not least 
important, UKIP wants to tighten control of immigration, and rejects multiculturalism (UKIP 
2015).  
 
The main purpose of this article is to add to the rather sketchy knowledge about the nature of 
UKIP. The analysis will be conducted with two main points of reference. One is the view of UKIP 
as a somewhat more radical, but non-extreme, extension of mainstream conservatism. There is 
much to suggest that this is the preferred self-image in large parts of the party. Indeed, several 
leading UKIP representatives, including its two MPs elected in 2014-15, were defectors from the 
Conservative Party. It is of course true that UKIP has also targeted disgruntled Labour voters, but 
they have not done so with left-leaning economic rhetoric or policies. Rather, the attempts to woo 
former Labour voters have highlighted immigration, and how money saved from leaving the EU 
can be used for health care, education etc. A second approach is to view UKIP as a member of the 
broader European extreme right party family. The vociferous EU criticism, and the increasingly 
negative stance on immigration, means that UKIP has at least as much in common with, e.g., the 
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6ZLVV3HRSOH¶V3DUW\DQG/HJD1RUG± DWDVWUHWFKHYHQWKH³GH-demRQLVHG´)UHQFK)URQW1DWLRQDO 
± as with the British Tories. 
 
What we thus aim to investigate is which of two models fits UKIP best ± the Tory model or the 
European Extreme Right (EER) model (the label Extreme Right will be used in full awareness that 
other designations exist). Our approach will be different to the existing literature on party classifi-
cation and party families. Instead of looking at party history and documents (compare Mair and 
Mudde 1998), focus will be on perceptions in the electorate. Employing like-dislike scales as the 
main variable, the public perception of UKIP will be investigated, and compared with the other 
main British parties plus BNP. The main aim is to locate and characterise the groups who like, and 
dislike, UKIP and compare them to the groups liking, and not liking, other British parties.  
 
Three questions will be given particular attention. First, where does UKIP fit into the British party 
system, in terms of sympathies/antipathies? Are they mostly like BNP, i.e. marginalised if not 
ostracised, or have they moved closer towards the mainstream of UK politics? Second, how similar 
are the support patterns of UKIP in comparison with what is known about the EER? The EER 
support patterns will be referred to as the Extreme Right Template, and presented below. The 
question we aim to answer is whether UKIP, when the template is applied, is more similar to BNP 
or the Conservatives. Third, where do UKIP votes come from? How homogenous or heterogene-
ous is their support? Are they single-issue Eurosceptics, do they fit better with the Extreme Right 
template ± or are they also taking votes from traditional Tory or Labour support? 
 
The analysis covers two time points, using data from the 2010 and 2015 British Election Studies 
(BES). This will allow us to assess whether the standing of UKIP among British voters remained 
stable during a period when the party went from being an outside irritant to become a major threat 
against the mainstream parties. Despite being punished by the electoral system used in Westmin-
ster elections, its share of the vote has become big enough to affect the strategies of other parties. 
BNP, meanwhile, seemed on the verge of a breakthrough after winning two seats in the 2009 EU 
election, but soon succumbed to internal splits. The party still existed in 2017, but was in serious 
decline. This also means that the 2015 BES data could be the last opportunity to include BNP in a 
comparison of British parties.  
 
The Extreme Right template 
 
There is a vast literature on voting for extreme right parties (e.g. Givens 2005; van der Brug and 
Fennema 2007; Rydgren 2008), but a brief summary should be sufficient here. Beginning with 
socio-demographic characteristics, the extreme right vote is predominantly male (Mudde 
2007:111-118). Extreme right voters also tend to be young, and working or lower middle class 
(Hainsworth 2008:95-104; Givens 2005:60-66). The unemployed tend to be overrepresented (Giv-
ens 2005, ch. 4; Norris 2005:143). Comparative studies on employment sector are scarce, but 
country-specific studies suggest that extreme right votes tend to come from the private sector (e.g. 
De Weert and De Witte 2007; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013:139; Andersen and Andersen 
2007:214f). Extreme right voters tend, finally, to have comparatively low levels of education (Nor-
ris 2005:141f; Hainsworth 2008:95f); and not to be religious (Lubbers et al. 2002). 
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Regarding attitudinal factors, it is almost too obvious to mention that extreme right voters are 
against immigration. This is not to say that they necessarily hold outright racist views (Rydgren 
2008), but immigration has become a more or less universal factor behind extreme right voting 
(Lubbers et al. 2002; Stockemer 2016). Extreme right voters are also unhappy with the political 
establishment, even though the notion of an empty protest vote meets with little support in the 
literature (e.g. van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Oesch 2008). Other possible attitudinal factors 
include authoritarian views about law and order, and obedience to authority, which is a key part of 
the extreme right message (Mudde 2007). EU criticism is a core value for the vast majority of 
extreme right parties in Europe, although this was not always the case historically (Müller 2002). 
Regarding the economy, most extreme right parties have adopted a pro-welfare stance, referred to 
as welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2000).  
 
A third set of variables is to do with the personal characteristics of extreme right voters. Findings 
by Wilcox et al. (2003), based on macro-level data, suggest that extreme right parties tend to per-
form better in countries with low levels of social capital. An individual-level analysis by Rydgren 
(2009), spanning six West European countries, does not find evidence to support any crude gen-
eralisations of extreme right voters as isolated and socially inept, but the exact results vary accord-
ing to the indicators used, and also across different countries. Despite the ambiguities, social cap-
ital is a factor that cannot be overlooked, and will be included in our analysis. 
 
The final group of factors will be media consumption. Research evidence indicates that levels of 
support for an extreme right party are not primarily affected by the reporting about the party itself, 
EXWUDWKHUWKHWUHDWPHQWRIWKHSDUW\¶VSULRULWLVHGLVVXHV$QREYLRXVH[DPSOHLVLPPLJUDWLRQ± it 
plays into the hands of an extreme right party if the media frequently report immigration as a 
problem, such as immigrant crime or difficulties with integration (Walgrave and de Swert 2004). 
In a similar vein, media outlets that frequently provide negative reports about the EU can be ex-
pected to benefit an EU critical party. We will, therefore, test the impact of reading different news-
papers with varying perspectives on immigration and the EU. 
 
Data  
 
The data used will be from the last two British Election Studies, namely the 2010 Campaign In-
ternet Panel Survey (CIPS) (Clarke et al. 2011) and the 2014-17 British Election Study Internet 
Panel (BESIP) (Fieldhouse et al. 2015). This provides large numbers of respondents sympathising 
with even relatively minor parties, like BNP or UKIP (as the latter still were in 2010). A disad-
vantage is that some of the variables discussed above do not appear in the most straightforward 
form. Also, since both are internet surveys, they suffer from under-representation of certain social 
groups which in our case may be of particular interest, given the social composition of extreme 
right party support. However, it has been found that the Internet-based YouGov surveys used for 
the BES compare quite well with face-to-face surveys, and CIPS as well as BESIP provide weight 
variables. For the following analyses, we have used data from the pre-campaign wave of the CIPS 
panel (the only survey asking like/dislike questions about all parties of interest, including BNP) 
and from the fourth wave of BESIP (the pre-campaign wave in 2015). For all analyses, we are 
using the standard weight variable for the full sample. 
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Our main variable of interest LVQRWYRWLQJRUYRWH LQWHQWLRQEXW WKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQ³2QD
scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how to 
you feel about SDUW\["´,Q%(6,3DVSOLWVDPSOHGHVLJQZDVemployed where half the sample was 
asked this like/dislike question, while the other half was asked a propensity to vote question (PTV): 
³How likely is it that you would ever vote for each of the following parties?´7KH379TXHVWLRQ
tends to be more discriminating in the responses it elicits, but otherwise the trends are very com-
parable. In all our analyses here, we focus on the measure that is comparable across studies, the 
like/dislike scale.1  
 
In contrast to vote choice, this variable allows for a more nuanced analysis. A comparison of vote 
choice models including BNP also becomes impossible to estimate due to the very small N for 
BNP in 2015 (around 50 out of a sample of over 30,000). The independent variables for the second 
part of our analysis include socio-demographics, attitudinal variables and media consumption in 
RUGHUWRFRPSDUHHDFKSDUW\¶VVXSSRUWZLWKWKHDERYH-GLVFXVVHG³H[WUHPHULJKWWHPSODWH´7KHUH
are some differences with regard to measurement and availability of variables across the two pan-
els, which are discussed below. The British Election Study started to include like/dislike scales for 
both UKIP and BNP only in 2010, which means that 2010-2015 is the only period where a detailed 
analysis of attitudes towards parties including BNP and UKIP is possible.  
 
The position of UKIP in the British party system 
 
The starting point of this research was the simple observation that when like/dislike scores were 
correlated among all available pairs of British parties2 in 2010, the largest positive correlation was 
between UKIP and BNP (see Table 1.1). It was only matched by the negative correlation between 
Labour and the Conservatives - the dominant partisan divide in British politics. To our knowledge, 
it is unprecedented to find a positive association in attitudes towards two British parties coming so 
close to emulating the negative association between the two main players in British party politics.  
 
Table 1.1 HERE 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, we continue to observe a large positive correlation between UKIP and BNP 
in 2015 (see Table 1.2), despite the widely diverging electoral fortunes of the two parties - UKIP 
securing more than 3.8 million votes and BNP reduced to 1,667 votes. 
 
Table 1.2 HERE 
 
Seen in isolation, the correlations reported in Tables 1.1-1.2 imply some systematic co-occurrence 
of antipathy as well as sympathy towards both parties. For example, a majority of remaining BNP 
sympathisers become UKIP voters by 2015. At the opposite end almost everyone who scored 
UKIP zero on the like/dislike scale also gave BNP a zero. But the correlation, while strong, is far 
from perfect. It does not mean that every supporter of UKIP also likes BNP, or that everyone who 
                                                 
1
 We ran robustness checks with PTV scores and the general pattern of findings was consistently confirmed. The 
main difference is that correlations between PTV scores tend to be lower, reflecting the somewhat different distribu-
tions of answers that PTV scores tend to obtain compared with thermometer scores. 
2
 We are only considering the six parties competing Britain-wide, excluding regional parties like the Scottish Na-
tional Party and Plaid Cymru. 
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despises BNP is equally dismissive of UKIP. We should, indeed, not just look at this relationship 
in isolation. Tables 1.1-1.2 show a complex, but not unstructured, pattern of positive and negative 
associations across British parties. Attitudes towards parties that are traditionally understood to be 
on the right of the political spectrum (Conservatives, UKIP, BNP) are all positively correlated, as 
are attitudes towards all three parties traditionally located to the left, or centre-left (Labour, Liberal 
Democrats, Greens), while across the left-right divide correlations are negative. The only real ex-
ceptions to this pattern are (a) the Tory-LibDem coalition partners becoming positively associated 
by 2015 and (b) weak negative correlations between BNP, LibDems and Greens losing signifi-
cance in 2015, a consequence of almost universal disapproval, and increasing irrelevance, of BNP.  
 
But, importantly, the patterns of negative and positive correlations do not imply a straightforward 
unidimensional party preference space that runs from the far right to the far left. Remember that 
the strongest negative correlation is between two non-extreme parties, Labour and the Conserva-
tives. 
 
A better way to illustrate where UKIP as a political party fits into the British party system, how 
systematically similar to the BNP it is perceived and whether it has made any inroads into the 
mainstream of British politics, is multidimensional unfolding (Coombs 1950, Busing 2010). This 
is a technique that jointly maps row (in our case respondents) and column entities (in our case 
political parties) from either ranking or rating data in a low-dimensional common space. The al-
ready utilised 0-10 like-dislike scales will be used as data input. Mapping respondents and parties 
from these input data results in a representation of party preference rank orderings, where the dis-
tance between a respondent and a party is inversely related to how highly the respondent rates that 
party compared with all other parties.3 As already mentioned, there are good reasons to argue that 
a unidimensional representation of the latent preference space is not an option - a simple left-right 
dimension is not sufficient to map all the variation in party preference orders across individuals. 
However, a two-dimensional solution proves easily sufficient, not just conceptually but also in 
terms of model diagnostics. 
 
Including only respondents who answered the like-dislike question for all six parties, we arrive at 
sample sizes of N=13,923 for 2010 and N=13,596 for 2015. We are using PREFSCAL4, one of the 
few algorithms for multidimensional unfolding that guarantees avoiding degenerative solutions 
(Busing 2010). The unfolding analysis maps over 13,000 row items (respondents) and six column 
items (parties) in a two-dimensional space, with proximities defined as similarities and ties being 
kept (i.e. identical scores for two parties translate into equidistance from the respondent). The 
arrived solutions show no degeneracy, account in each case for 93% of dispersion in the original 
data, for 73% of variance in 2010 and 72% in 2015. The left panel in Figure 1 presents the latent 
party preference space in 2010 and the right panel the preference space in 2015.  
 
                                                 
3
 7KHPHWDSKRURIµXQIROGLQJ¶UHODWHVWR&RRPEV¶Rriginal unidimensional conceptualization but can be 
equally be used to illustrate a two-dimensional solution: if you were to lift the plane that represents the latent party 
preference space at the location of any respondent and fold it into one scale, the top of that scale (the location of the 
respondent) would represent the ideal point, and the parties would be located in descending order along the scale. 
0XOWLGLPHQVLRQDOXQIROGLQJLVZKDW%XVLQJFDOOVWKH³UHYHUVHRSHUDWLRQ´ZHEHJLQZLWKWKHSreference 
orders of individual respondents and the objective is to find the joint party preference space. 
4
 PREFSCAL is available as a module in IBM SPSS Statistics. 
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Two important caveats are in order before interpreting these unfolding graphs: first, this should 
not be misunderstood as a latent policy space. While the latent preference space may be informed 
by left-right or other ideological dimensions, the two dimensions of our unfolding map do not 
directly translate into those. Hence, any movement of a party between 2010 and 2015 only implies 
that its relative popularity vis-à-vis other parties has altered. Second, while the unfolding algorithm 
used here retains object rankings it does not retain precise object ratings. The closest party in the 
latent policy space revealed by unfolding is simply the highest ranked of that respondent, the sec-
ond-closest the second-highest ranked and so on. This would remain the case also if, for example, 
a respondent put all parties below the mid-point of the 0-10 scale. 
 
Since the main focus here is on the relative standing of UKIP within this party preference space, 
the data in Figure 1 are presented in the form of D³KHDWPDS´ with reference to UKIP. The red-
shaded (warmest) area contains respondents who rank UKIP highest in their preference order. The 
pink-shaded area contains those who rank UKIP within the top two of their preference order, while 
the blue-shaded (coldest) area contains those ranking UKIP and BNP at the bottom of their pref-
erence orders. 
 
Figure 1 HERE 
 
Primarily, the maps illustrate how UKIP remains at the margins of the British party system and is, 
by far, the party closest to BNP. In contrast to BNP, however, UKIP bridges the space between 
the extreme right fringe and the political mainstream. Almost all BNP supporters (of which few 
are left in 2015) have UKIP as their second choice,5 and about half of UKIP supporters rank BNP 
second.6 By 2015, UKIP have certainly expanded their reach into the extreme right, becoming the 
primary choice of most of those with any sympathies for BNP. 
 
TKHH[SDQVLRQRI8.,3¶VHOHFWRUDOUHDFKLQLVHYLGHQWalso on other fronts. While in 2010 
UKIP was outside the top two in an overwhelming majority of preference orders (blue- and white-
shaded areas combined), by 2015 the red- and pink-shaded areas have both expanded considerably, 
indicating that UKIP has become competitive among a much larger portion of the electorate. At 
the same time UKIP has become a more polarizing force. The blue-shaded area, containing those 
who reject UKIP and pigeon-hole them together with BNP, has also expanded. This segment is 
almost exclusively populated by those favouring Liberal Democrats, Greens and Labour. There is 
little indifference (white areas) left in the 2015 map. 
 
UKIP has expanded both in terms of outright support and competitiveness. The red-shaded area 
has increased, and is also more populated in 2015, implying that more respondents favour the party 
above all others. This growth comes from taking away outright support from both BNP and Con-
servatives. But, perhaps more importantly, the lighter pink-shaded area (respondents who rank 
them within their top two) has increased considerably, implying that UKIP are much more com-
petitive. On that front they are encroaching considerably on Conservative and to a lesser extent on 
Labour territory. UKIP has become more competitive, and perhaps electable, in some parts of the 
                                                 
5
 The lower pink triangle contains over 90% of those ranking BNP top; the rest are in the adjacent white area and 
rank Labour second. 
6
 Almost exactly the bottom half of the red-shaded area in 2010, and the less populated bottom two thirds of the red 
shaded area in 2015. 
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electorate at the same time as having become more maligned and pigeon-holed as an extreme right 
party in other parts. The party has soaked up more far right support in 2015, with BNP being ever 
more marginalised, but at least as much of the growth in popularity has been through expansion 
into the mainstream of British party politics.  
 
Critically, WKH³ZDUP´DUHDVLQthe heat map from unfolding analysis show UKIP as nested between 
BNP and the Conservatives. About half of those who rank UKIP top have BNP as second prefer-
ence; the other half has the Conservatives second. UKIP is much more likely to be second-ranked 
to the CoQVHUYDWLYHVWKDQWR/DERXULQDQ\RQH¶VSUHIHUHQFHRUGHU± which is evident from the pink-
shaded area next to the Conservatives comfortably exceeding the size of the corresponding area 
closest to Labour. So if, in terms of preference orders, UKIP shares about as much with BNP as 
with the Conservatives, how does that translate into the nature of their support base? Does UKIP 
support follow the Extreme Right Template, meaning that it has links not only to BNP but to a 
broader European extreme right party family, or does it have more in common with more tradi-
tional centre-right support of a party like the Conservatives? That question is what we turn to next. 
  
&RPSDULQJ8.,3¶VVXSSRUWEDVHZLWKWKDWRIBNP and the Conservatives 
 
The preceding analysis implies that UKIP are deriving support and sympathies from the extreme 
right fringe as well as some section of the British population that falls into the political mainstream. 
To understand this bridging position of the party a bit better, we aim in our second step to test the 
extent to which UKIP fits the earlier described Extreme Right Template. In order to test that overall 
relationship as well as its evolution over a period in which UKIP became significantly more pop-
ular, while BNP almost disappeared as an electoral option, we ran regressions on data from again 
both 2010 and 2015. Most of the independent variables in the models presented below are straight-
forward, but changes in the questionnaires mean that it is not possible to replicate the analysis 
exactly across the two time points. The 2015 survey lacks information about, for example, sector 
employment, prospective personal finances and social capital. On the other hand, it includes items 
from which we could construct an authoritarianism scale which was missing in the 2010 panel. In 
some cases question wordings and response options have been altered. Nevertheless, there is 
enough similarity between the two time points to allow meaningful comparison. (See Appendix A 
for a summary of how variables were measured in both surveys.) 
 
The nature of our dependent variables (feeling thermometer scores for UKIP, BNP and the Con-
servatives) makes the choice of an adequate model for analysis anything but straightforward, how-
ever. The more general question of whether a 0-10 scale is better understood as a continuous or 
ordinal variable is not at the heart of our problem, since thermometer scales, just as PTV scores, 
tend to meet the fundamental requirements for treating an ordinal scale as though it were continu-
ous (Kim 1975).7 Our main problem lies not in the measurement, but in the frequency distribution 
of our dependent variables. These are shown in Figure 2, and it becomes quite clear that our de-
pendent variables deviate considerably from a normal distribution. In particular, they consistently 
expose a severe floor effect, with respondents clustering at 0 (=extreme dislike of the party in 
question); more so in case of BNP than UKIP or the Conservatives, and much more so in 2015 
than earlier across all three parties.  
                                                 
7
 We did, however, carry out robustness checks by re-running analyses with ordered logit, and none of the substan-
tive findings change. 
9 
 
 
Figure 2 HERE 
 
The problem of a dependent variable which is constrained, and exposes severe clustering at the 
constraint, can be tackled with a Tobit, or censored regression model (Long 1997, Cameron and 
Trivedi 2009). If there is severe clustering at zero, using OLS regressions will result in an under-
HVWLPDWHGLQWHUFHSWDQGRYHUHVWLPDWHGVORSHEHFDXVH³WKHFHQVRUHGREVHUYDWLRQVRQWKHOHIWSXOO
GRZQWKDWHQGRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQOLQH´/RQJ7RELWPRGHOVdeal with this problem by 
estimating the effects on a latent variable that is not censored, i.e. can take on values below the 
constraint.8 More specifically, Tobit models work through maximum likelihood estimation that 
combines a probit and a linear regression element modelling, first, the impact of the independent 
variables on the probability of a score being above zero and, second, combining this with their 
linear impact on variation in values above zero.9 Tobit models are particularly useful for our pur-
poses insofar as they allow calculating standardized coefficients ± albeit less straightforward than 
in OLS (Long 1997, pp. 207f).  This provides us with a suitable tool to analyse and visualise the 
extent to which the support base of UKIP resembles that of either of the other two parties. Results 
are reported in Figures 3 and 4 for the 2010 and 2015 models, respectively.10 Full model specifi-
cations can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 3 AND Figure 4 HERE 
 
The findings from both years, but particularly from 2010, are quite remarkable. Almost without 
exception, the same socio-economic indicators are significant and pull attitudes towards both BNP 
and UKIP in the same direction. In contrast, the effects of most socio-economic variables point in 
the opposite direction when it comes to the Conservatives. Evaluations of both UKIP and BNP 
improve among young,11 male, working class respondents on low incomes and with low levels of 
                                                 
8
 It is of course understood that feeling thermometer scores, just as PTV scores, are constrained not by failing to re-
port negative scores, but by having zero as one of its endpoints. In our case, however, there is something intuitive 
about considering the notion of an underlying latent variable that is not censored: imagine that respondents were in 
addition to the rating of parties on these scales also asked to rank-order them, from most- to least-liked party. It is 
quite reasonable to assume that many, if not most, of those respondents who scored both UKIP and BNP zero would 
rank BNP below UKIP. This would imply that the scale is indeed censored by not allowing expression of residual 
non-random variation in party preference among those scoring more than one party zero. Indeed, the use of Tobit 
models for the analysis of survey data with 11-point scale dependent variables has been suggested before (Auspurg 
and Hinz 2015). 
9
 Dependent variables can be modelled as censored from below, or from both below and above. Technically, the 0-
10 scales are censored from above and below, but since there is no clustering at 10, there is no gain in comparison 
with OLS from defining the dependent as censored from above, so we restricted to imputing a censoring at zero. 
10
 Figures 4 and 5 include only independent variables that have significant effect on at least one of our different de-
pendent variables. Insignificant effects are indicated by lighter shades. Two caveats with regard to the comparison of 
standardized coefficients in Figures 4 and 5: first, we cannot use a weight variable when calculating standardized 
coefficients for a Tobit model, so these are from unweighted models, which does result in minor differences but 
does not alter the direction of any individual regressor. Second, it is of course understood that standardized coeffi-
cients cannot be directly compared across models, since they only calculate explanatory power in relation to other 
factors included in the same model. Especially since inclusion and measurement of variables differs somewhat 
across time points, Figures 4 and 5 should only be taken as a graphic illustration of a rough comparison of relative 
impact of the same independent variable in the separate models. 
11
 The age effect for UKIP is counter-intuitive, given that their support base tends to be older, but once we control 
for attitudes, newspaper readership etc., the residual age effect does turn negative. This is also borne out by robust-
ness checks using ordered logit (see note 7). 
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education, and in 2010 (when measured) particularly among those working in the private sector. 
All of these are socio-demographic characteristics that fit the extreme right template. The only 
socio-demographic factor that clearly goes against the extreme right template is religion, which 
was insignificant for both parties in 2010, and had a positive effect on both parties in 2015. Ten-
WDWLYHO\WKLVFRXOGEHUHODWHGWRERWKSDUWLHV¶LQWHQVLI\LQJFULWLFLVPRI,VODP In 2010 evaluations 
of the Conservatives are higher among females, high income earners and private sector employees, 
while they go down among respondents with routine and manual occupations. In 2015, we find 
less impact of gender. Income and class still matter, while there is no data on sector employment. 
Not unexpectedly, religion has a positive effect on attitudes to the Conservatives on both occa-
sions. 
 
Things look different when it comes to political efficacy or political integration. Here, UKIP sup-
port is much more similar to that of the Conservatives. BNP support maximises among those with 
low levels of trust, satisfaction with democracy and political attention. At least in 2010 the opposite 
is the case for both UKIP and the Conservatives ± the impact is much stronger for the Conserva-
tives. By 2015, UKIP becomes a little more located between the other two. Political attention now 
only has a positive effect on what respondents think of UKIP. And while satisfaction with democ-
racy has a much larger impact on what you make of the Conservatives (a clear incumbency effect), 
it continues to be insignificant for UKIP and has become insignificant for BNP. 
 
Newspaper readership tends to pull largely in the same direction for all three parties, but more 
frequently so for UKIP and Conservatives than for BNP. All three parties are unpopular among 
Guardian readers, but popular among Daily Mail readers in 2010, and Sun readers in 2015. The 
Mail effect disappears for BNP in 2015, while Sun readers actually take more to all three parties 
in 2015 than in 2010. The Telegraph consistently pulls readers towards UKIP and, especially, the 
Conservatives, but not BNP. 
 
When it comes to attitudes, some marked differences are apparent. Being economically right-wing, 
while pulling in the same direction throughout, has by far the strongest effect on Conservative 
support, and the least impact on what you think of BNP, with UKIP in between. Interesting changes 
over time occur with regard to attitudes towards immigration and EU integration. The EU consist-
ently matters most for UKIP, but disappears as a factor for BNP in 2015. For the Conservatives 
the EU issue remains significant, but has consistently much less impact than on UKIP. Immigration 
has a comparatively limited effect on Conservative support. Unsurprisingly, the effect is much 
stronger for BNP, with UKIP in between. In 2015, however, the effect of immigration on UKIP 
support has almost caught up with that of BNP. Authoritarian attitudes (only available in 2015) 
also maximise BNP as well as UKIP support almost equally, while mattering a lot less for attitudes 
towards the Conservatives. 
 
Overall, then, the picture is mixed. As far as socio-demographics and attitudes are concerned, the 
basis of UKIP support comes across as much more similar to that of BNP than of the Conserva-
tives. On the other hand the analysis indicates that UKIP supporters are more politically integrated 
than their BNP counterparts; in that respect being more Tory than extreme right. However, the 
analysis presented in this section averages effects across entire survey samples, and combines fac-
tors explaining sympathies as well as antipathies. The unfolding plot from the previous section 
implies that while BNP supporters come across as relatively homogenous in their ± largely positive 
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± evaluations of UKIP, not all UKIP supporters seem to reciprocate. There could, therefore, be 
significant variations in how they relate to both the extreme right and the moderate centre-right 
neighbour. In addition, although some UKIP supporters share demographic and attitudinal charac-
teristics with BNP supporters, others may not. The appropriate method to disentangle such poten-
tial heterogeneity in UKIP support is latent class analysis (LCA), which is what we move to in the 
final step of the analysis. 
 
The heterogeneity of UKIP support  
 
In order to investigate in more detail whether, and to what extent, support for right wing parties 
and mutual appreciation among supporters of such parties is heterogeneous across societal groups, 
we conduct a latent class analysis (LCA).12 LCA is a method that seeks to locate groups, or sub-
types of cases (latent classes), in multivariate categorical data. In our case, the aim is to find sub-
groups in the British electorate that are characterised by within-group homogeneity and between-
group heterogeneity in how they assess UKIP, BNP and the Conservatives. The main purpose is 
to disaggregate patterns of UKIP support: does the party have different types of supporters, and 
can we estimate the extent to which UKIP attracts extreme right voters compared with its compet-
itiveness among more mainstream voters? 
 
For these purposes, we created dummy variables from like-dislike scores for all three parties of 
interest ± UKIP, BNP and Conservatives. Given that 0 is the modal category for each party, we 
kept scoring a party 0, i.e. rejecting it, as a separate category. We then simplified, in order not to 
have eleven dummy variables per party, and created three further categories summarizing negative 
(1-3), neutral (4-6) and positive (7-10) evaluations. Only including respondents who answered the 
like-dislike question for all of our studied parties, we arrive at 12 items per respondent, with each 
respondent providing three responses (1) and nine non-responses (0). In the LCA plugin, parame-
ters are estimated by maximum-likelihood, with *DPPDȖSDUDPHters expressing correspond-
ence between observed items and latent classes, DQG5KRȡSDUDPHWHUVH[SUHVVLQJLWHP-response 
probabilities conditional on latent class membership. We ultimately arrived at a model with seven 
latent classes, on the basis of both model fit and theoretical fit. Evaluating model fit, we found that 
neither Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) nor Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) improved 
beyond a seven class solution, while entropy, i.e. classification uncertainty, only tended to reduce 
up to that point. On the theoretical side, while more parsimonious solutions (three or four class 
models) were possible, only with seven latent classes were we able to distinguish key subgroups. 
It was, in addition, found that a model with seven latent classes produces persuasively similar 
patterns for both the 2010 and the 2015 data. Figures 5 and 6 graphically illustrate the item-re-
VSRQVHSUREDELOLWLHV5KRȡSDUDPHWHUVIRUthe party dummies derived from the like-dislike scale 
across the seven classes. :HDUHXVLQJDVLPLODUFRORXUFRGLQJWRWKHHDUOLHU³KHDWPDS´± red indi-
cates supporting and blue rejecting a party. 
 
Figure 5 AND Figure 6 HERE 
 
The latent classes can be meaningfully labelled ± WKHILUVWFODVVDVWKH³([WUHPH/HIW´FKDUDFWHU
ized by joint rejection of all three parties: the probability of rejecting BNP (0) is .97 in 2010 and 
                                                 
12
 We ran the analysis in Stata, using the LCA Stata plugin from The Methodology Centre at Penn State University 
(https://methodology.psu.edu/downloads/lcastata).  
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approaches 1.0 in 2015. In fact in 2015, probability of rejecting both UKIP and BNP approaches 
1.0 while giving the Conservatives a negative score (1-3) equally approaches certainty. There is 
slightly more variation in 2010 but not much. The second class, labelled ³&HQWUH-/HIW´, is charac-
terized by large-scale rejection of both UKIP and BNP while the probability of giving the Con-
servatives a neutral (4-6) or positive (7-10) score is less than .5. The picture becomes more mixed 
moving through classes 3 ³&HQWUH´4 ³&HQWUH-5LJKW´DQG5 ³&RQVHUYDWLYH´7KHSUobability 
of giving the Conservatives a neutral or positive score stabilizes at .6 or higher, while BNP remains 
largely rejected by the ³Centre´, and negatively evaluated by the ³Centre-Right´ and ³Conserva-
tive´ groups.  
 
UKIP received exclusively negative scores by the ³Centre´ and ³Centre-Right´ groups, and neutral 
scores by ³Conservatives´ in 2010, while faring slightly better in the ³Centre-Right´ class in 2015. 
BNP fared much better among the sixth and seventh classes, ³(XURVFHSWLFV´DQG³Extreme Right´
in 2010 than in 2015. In 2010 the odds of BNP being rejected, or receiving negative or neutral 
scores by ³(XURVFHSWLFV´ were roughly even, but in 2015 they were outright rejected. While, fur-
thermore, the probability of positive scores for BNP from the ³Extreme Right´ class was approach-
ing 1.0 in 2010, it changed to a .65 probability of neutral and .35 probability of positive scores in 
2015. For UKIP, the ³Eurosceptic´ group is a secure source of positive evaluations, while the 
probability of positive scores IURPWKH³Extreme 5LJKW´FODVVincreased from .55 in 2010 to .85 in 
2015. 
 
While the patterns look remarkably similar when comparing 2010 and 2015, the relative sizes of 
the latent classes differ, in some cases considerably, between the two time points. The three latent 
classes to the right (³Conservatives´, ³Eurosceptics´ and ³Extreme Right´) have all declined in 
size by 2015, while the ³Centre-Right´ and ³Centre-Left´JURXSV have both roughly doubled (see 
percentages reported below each class). The ³Extreme Left´FODVV has declined to almost half its 
size from 2010.  
 
In order to externally validate the substantive meaning of these latent classes, WKH³EHVW LQGH[´
variable that LCA creates (an indicator of which latent class is the best match for each individual 
based on posterior probabilities) is merged back into the 2010 and 2015 BES internet panel da-
tasets. It can then be estimated how well socio-demographic and attitudinal factors explain latent 
class membership. Differently put: how much more likely does a certain individual characteristic 
make it for a respondent to be assigned to one of the seven classes? We ran multinomial regres-
sions, separately for each year, using the ³Centre´ latent class as reference category. Tables 2.1 
and 2.2 report the unstandardized B coefficients from multinomial regressions.  
 
Table 2.1 AND Table 2.2 HERE 
 
Age matters little and only insofar as the ³([WUHPH Right´ is typically younger. Gender matters 
much more ± the further to the right, the more likely respondents are to be male. Education matters 
much more in 2015 than in 2010. In the former year only respondents in the ³Extreme Right´ 
group were significantly less likely to have a degree than those in the ³Centre´. In 2015 almost all 
other groupsDSDUWIURPWKH³Extreme /HIW´ showed lower levels of education than the ³Centre´. 
On the other hand, class mattered more in 2010, with the working class flocking to the extremes ± 
everyone but the ³&HQWUH-Right´ were more likely to be of working class background than those 
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in the ³Centre´. In 2015, this had disappeared. In terms of social composition the now smaller 
³Extreme Left´JURXS has changed considerably. In 2010, this group was made up by members of 
the working class, secular and with low incomes. In 2015 it is over-proportionally female, finan-
cially well-off (i.e. not significantly different from the ³Centre´ class which is significantly better 
off financially than everyone to the right of the spectrum) with high levels of education, but low 
levels of political attention. 
 
Dissatisfaction with democracy is characteristic of those at both extremes in the political spectrum. 
Our changing economic left right variables (tax-v-spend in 2010, redistribution scale in 2015) 
show similar patterns:  the two classes on the left are considerably more to the left economically 
than those in the ³Centre´, while everyone from the ³Centre´ to the ³Extreme Right´ is economi-
cally right wing to an almost equal extent. Differences emerge instead with regard to attitudes 
towards the EU, immigration and, in 2015, authoritarianism. The further to the right, the more 
extreme respondents are on all of these. Notably, however, anti-European attitudes maximize 
within the ³Eurosceptic´ class, while anti-immigration and authoritarian attitudes maximize 
strongly in the ³Extreme Right´FODVV. Newspaper readership is related to latent class membership 
largely as expected, but it is interesting to note that in 2015 reading the Sun is increasingly becom-
ing an indicator of being further to the right in the spectrum. The Daily Mail is rejected by ³Ex-
treme OHIW´ and ³Centre-Left´, but almost equally likely to be read among all other groups, from 
³Centre´ to ³Extreme Right´.  
 
The model works marginally better in 2015 than in 2010 ± but overall this nicely confirms the 
socio-demographic and attitudinal coherence within groups, and the meaningful contrasts between 
groups, produced by the LCA. It is important to remember that these co-variates were not used in 
any form to initially identify latent classes; the latter were entirely based on analysis of like-dislike 
scales vis-à-vis our three parties of interest. But the analysis shows that there is a clear social and 
attitudinal basis to how party ratings among respondents relate to each other.  
 
)LQDOO\ZHFDQXVH WKH/&$³EHVW LQGH[´YDULDEOH WRHVWLPDWHYRWHVKDUHVRIDOOSDUWLHVDFURVV
latent classes. And indeed, as can been seen from tables 3.1 and 3.2, voting behaviour has changed 
considerably in some instances between 2010 and 2015. Not so much in case of the ³Extreme Left´ 
class, which continues to reject UKIP, BNP and Conservatives alike at the ballot box. The ³Centre-
Left´ also rejects UKIP and BNP, but the Conservatives come out second or third strongest party 
in both elections. In 2010 the Conservatives had the largest vote share among all five remaining 
latent classes, from ³Centre´ to ³Extreme Right´, while UKIP only gained a serious vote share 
among ³Eurosceptic´ and ³Extreme 5LJKW´YRWHUV. In 2015, however, we see how UKIP soars and 
does so from the Centre-Right group onwards. Among ³Eurosceptics´ and ³Extreme Right´ it 
almost exactly matches the vote share of the Conservative Party. So, while in 2010 having the 
largest probability (even a certainty) to receive high scores did not translate into largest vote shares 
for either UKIP among ³Eurosceptics´ nor for BNP among the ³Extreme Right´, by 2015 UKIP 
managed to translate appreciation into votes. 
 
Table 3.1 AND Table 3.2 HERE 
 
As was already indicated by the earlier unfolding analysis, UKIP has at the same time become a 
core electoral option for ³Extreme Right´ voters as well as for ³Eurosceptics´. Both groups already 
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had strong sympathies for UKIP in 2010, but did not yet vote for them in large numbers. By 2015, 
both groups were equally likely to vote UKIP or Conservative. That is a remarkable finding, indi-
cating the growing reach and electoral competitiveness of UKIP on different fronts. In addition 
UKIP made inroads among more traditional Tories not obsessed with the EU, not authoritarian 
and not strongly anti-immigration. They had established themselves as an alternative centre-right 
party while at the same time having converted many extreme right supporters into voting for them. 
The picture is thus one of remarkable heterogeneity in UKIP support.  
 
One can tentatively go one step further, and use the figures from Table 3.2 to compare the relative 
importance of the divergent groups (the latent classes) for 8.,3¶VRYHUDOOHOHFWRUDOSHUIRUPDQFH. 
In 2015 the ³Extreme Right´ contributed about 20% of UKIP voters, while ³Eurosceptics´ ac-
counted for roughly a third. The rest came from WKH³Conservative´ (14%) and ³Centre Right´ 
(30%) classes. This is indeed a varied mix which raises important questions about what kind of 
party UKIP wants to be in the long run. At the extremes it already emulates the vote share of the 
Conservative Party, but almost half of the UKIP votes in 2015 came from moderates who remain 
much more likely to vote Conservative. These centrist classes are much more populated than the 
³Eurosceptics´ and ³Extreme Right´ and hence offer more potential for growth. The question then 
is whether UKIP wants to grow into a mainstream party or solidify its position as the party of 
choice for the more extreme parts of the electorate. An important additional question will of course 
be what becomes of ³Eurosceptics´ post-Brexit. They could fall back into the centre-right fold, or 
become more immigration-obsessed ± much depends on what ³%UH[LW´ZLOOPHDQLQSUDFWLFH.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The research presented above has been guided by three main questions. The first, where UKIP fits 
into the British party system, was answered with unfolding analysis. The results were not unequiv-
ocal. On the one hand UKIP was by far the closest party to BNP in both 2010 and 2015. Thus, it 
is not unreasonable to argue that UKIP has been located at the margins of the British party prefer-
ence space at both time points. On the other hand the outreach of UKIP expanded between 2010 
and 2015. In the latter year the party had taken over almost all latent BNP support, but at the same 
time become much more competitive among Tory and, to a lesser extent, Labour supporters. Thus, 
while there is a clear element of UKIP having moved towards the mainstream, it has not abandoned 
the fringes. 
 
The second question was how similar the support patterns of UKIP were in comparison to the 
European Extreme Right template. Using Tobit regression analysis, the comparison also involved 
the Conservative Party and BNP. The overall impression is that both BNP and UKIP fit the Ex-
treme Right template rather well, the main difference being social and political integration where 
UKIP comes across as more mainstream. The Tories also display some similarities to the template, 
but if the relative strengths of the effects are taken into account, BNP and UKIP display a better 
fit.  
 
The third question, tackled with Latent Class Analysis, was how UKIP support can be character-
ised. The results here are complex, but in essence they reinforce the indications provided by the 
unfolding analysis, namely that UKIP draws on two main sources of support; one quite extreme 
with the closest links to BNP, and one more moderately Eurosceptic, closer to the Conservatives. 
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In both 2010 and 2015 the biggest contributioQWR8.,3YRWLQJFRPHIURPWKH³(XURVFHSWLF´FODVV
ahead of WKH³Extreme 5LJKW´2IFRXUVH8.,3VXSSRUWLVPRUHGLYHUVHWKDQWKDWZLWKVL]HDEOH
PLQRULW\FRQWULEXWLRQVIURPWKH³&RQVHUYDWLYH´DQGLQHVSHFLDOO\³&HQWUH-5LJKW´FODVVHV
Still, the most appropriate summary is that UKIP support is primarily a mix of non-extreme Euro-
scepticism and more extreme right-wing radicalism.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis does not seem to show UKIP in direct competition with Labour. 
Ford and Goodwin (2014; 2016) argue that the growth of UKIP in the 2010s to a significant extent 
was the consequence of disillusioned working class voters abandoning Labour. Evans and Mellon 
(2016 a; b) disagree, arguing that the disgruntled working class voters had abandoned Labour be-
fore UKIP was a serious political force (2016a:477), and that the second preferences of UKIP 
supporters place the Tories well ahead of Labour (2016b:494f). Our findings lend more support to 
Evans and Mellon; the unfolding analysis shows UKIP and Labour far apart in the preference 
orders of most respondents. The contrast to the Conservative Party is striking. This does not nec-
essarily mean that UKIP has not taken Labour support. Rather, in line with Evans and Mellon, it 
seems that the shift from the Conservatives to UKIP is a comparatively smooth process, where 
some feelings remain for the former favourite party, but that the shift from Labour to UKIP seems 
conflictual, breeding resentment towards the previously preferred party. It may also be a longer 
process, with moves to other parties, or abstention, between departure from Labour and arrival at 
UKIP.  
 
Thus, the classification of UKIP is far from straightforward. There are elements of radicalism, but 
also with more mainstream right-of-centre traits. Arguably, the latter dominate. If BNP is the sole 
point of reference, the near-consensus in the literature about UKIP being a non-extreme party is 
supported. This said, there are also links to BNP. These should not be overstated, but nor are they 
trivial. If, furthermore, the frame of reference is extended, parallels can be detected with at least 
some members of the broader European extreme right party family. The impact of immigration on 
UKIP support is unequivocal, in 2015 close to that of BNP (see Figures 3 and 4). The most striking 
difference to BNP, social and political integration, does not make UKIP distinctive from several 
other European extreme right parties.  
 
The argument is not that UKIP can be conclusively classified as extreme right. For that more com-
parative research is needed. But while not straightforwardly extreme, nor is UKIP straightfor-
wardly mainstream. As shown by the unfolding and Latent Class analyses, the position of UKIP 
in the British party system can be described as a link between the mainstream and the extreme. 
This makes UKIP distinctive from other British parties, a distinctiveness with parallels to the po-
sitions of anti-establishment, EU sceptical and immigration-critical parties elsewhere in Europe. 
These parallels are hardly negated by the distinctiveness from the now almost defunct BNP. 
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Table 1.1: Correlations between party feeling thermometer scores in 2010 
 UKIP Conserva-tives Labour 
Liberal 
Democrats Greens 
BNP .522* .173* -.199* -.139* -.112* 
UKIP  .336* -.318* -.091* -.107* 
Conservatives   -.529* -.065* -.185* 
Labour    .209* .293* 
Liberal Democrats     .432* 
* Correlation significant at .001  
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 (Clarke et al 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Correlations between party feeling thermometer scores in 2015 
 UKIP Conserva-tives Labour 
Liberal 
Democrats Greens 
BNP .457* .095* -.028* .006 -.015 
UKIP  .314* -.268* -.130* -.283* 
Conservatives   -.438* .220* -.312* 
Labour    .197* .348* 
Liberal Democrats     .271* 
* Correlation significant at .001 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Table 2.1: Multinomial model: co-variants of latent class membership, 2010 
 
Extreme 
Left vs 
Centre 
Centre-
Left vs 
Centre 
Centre-
Right vs 
Centre 
Conservative 
vs Centre 
Euro-
sceptic 
vs Centre 
Extreme 
Right vs 
Centre 
 B B B B B B 
Age 0.025 0.090** 0.023 -0.049 0.028 -0.218*** 
Sex (male=1, female=2) -0.141 -0.050 -0.131 -0.183** -0.452*** -0.658*** 
Income -0.031** -0.018 -0.004 -0.009 -0.017 -0.055*** 
Education 0.143 0.090 -0.115 -0.112 -0.130 -0.283* 
Middle class 0.091 0.088 0.046 0.212** 0.076 0.169 
Working class 0.323** 0.315** 0.204 0.318** 0.260* 0.606*** 
Private sector -0.021 -0.059 0.342 0.049 -0.367 0.027 
Public sector 0.247 0.055 0.304 -0.027 -0.339 -0.089 
Religion -0.316*** -0.238** -0.146 -0.071 -0.108 -0.140 
Personal finance (retrospective) -0.002 0.022 0.022 -0.007 0.012 0.011 
Personal finance (prospective) 0.030 -0.053 -0.009 -0.051 -0.052 -0.039 
Political attention -0.017 0.061*** -0.117*** -0.019 0.069*** 0.035 
Satisfaction with democracy in UK -0.208*** -0.172*** -0.152** -0.133** -0.192*** -0.212*** 
Trust in people 0.008 -0.044* -0.024 0.013 0.014 -0.088*** 
Tax vs spend 0.132*** 0.116*** -0.026 -0.032 -0.062** -0.039 
EU integration 0.186*** 0.258*** -0.015 -0.393*** -1.045*** -0.812*** 
Attitude towards immigration 0.128*** 0.099*** -0.163*** -0.147*** -0.250*** -0.406*** 
Daily Mail -0.361** -0.238* 0.282* 0.325*** 0.295** 0.375** 
Daily Star 0.414 -0.053 0.449 0.618 -0.583 0.483 
Guardian 0.577*** 0.535*** -0.165 -0.472** -1.130** -0.245 
Sun -0.322* -0.403** 0.207 -0.040 -0.154 -0.158 
Telegraph -0.814*** -0.446** -0.155 0.001 -0.030 0.007 
N 10,878      
-2 Log Likelihood 35238.633      
Pseudo R-Square        
Cox and Snell 0.479      
McFadden 0.168           
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p,.001 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 (Clarke et al 2011) 
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Table 2.2: Multinomial model: co-variants of latent class membership, 2015 
 
Extreme 
Left vs 
Centre 
Centre-
Left vs 
Centre 
Centre-
Right vs 
Centre 
Conservative 
vs Centre 
Euro-
sceptic 
vs Cen-
tre 
Extreme 
Right vs 
Centre 
 B B B B B B 
Age -0.004 0.005 -0.010** -0.007* 0.001 -0.022*** 
Sex (male=1, female=2) 0.378*** 0.398*** -0.189* -0.216* -0.501*** -0.216 
Income 0.022 -0.022 -0.041** -0.030* -0.039* -0.050** 
Education 0.019 -0.314*** -0.256** -0.460*** -0.443*** -0.576*** 
Middle class -0.101 -0.102 0.008 -0.094 0.138 -0.193 
Working class -0.030 -0.083 0.097 0.109 -0.097 0.143 
Religion -0.013 -0.090 0.211* 0.176 -0.026 0.022 
Personal finance (retrospective) -0.072 -0.109** -0.039 -0.030 -0.070 -0.107 
Political attention -0.043 0.090*** -0.018 0.025 0.179*** 0.125*** 
Satisfaction with democracy in UK -0.130* -0.160*** -0.091 -0.057 -0.135* -0.157* 
Redistribution (self) 0.114*** 0.119*** -0.024 -0.030 -0.025 -0.012 
EU integration 0.109*** 0.095*** -0.014 -0.112*** -0.334*** -0.097*** 
Attitude towards immigration 0.124*** 0.084*** -0.124*** -0.095*** -0.147*** -0.280*** 
Authoritarianism -0.064*** 0.012 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.096*** 0.153*** 
Daily Mail -0.746*** -0.665*** 0.097 0.016 0.266* -0.310 
Daily Star 1.340* 1.085* 0.910* 1.156** 1.187* 1.533** 
Guardian 0.225 0.292* -0.269 -0.517* -1.504** -0.446 
Sun -0.243 -0.150 0.556*** 0.404** 0.353* 0.625*** 
Telegraph -0.969*** -0.605*** -0.038 0.112 -0.032 -0.509 
N 7,996      
-2 Log Likelihood 24073.888      
Pseudo R-Square        
Cox and Snell 0.586      
McFadden 0.226           
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p,.001 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Table 3.1: Vote choice by latent class membership, 2010 
  
Extreme 
Left 
Centre-
Left Centre 
Centre-
Right 
Conser-
vative 
Euro-
Sceptic 
Extreme 
Right Total 
No, did not vote 7.1% 6.8% 6.2% 11.1% 6.7% 4.5% 8.9% 7.0% 
Conservative 2.1% 21.0% 37.5% 30.4% 46.2% 48.3% 37.9% 32.0% 
Labour 40.8% 35.4% 26.2% 26.8% 18.6% 10.0% 15.6% 25.6% 
Liberal Democrat 43.1% 30.4% 26.9% 25.8% 20.7% 14.4% 15.8% 26.3% 
SNP 2.3% 2.5% 1.0% 1.7% 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% 
Plaid Cymru 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 
Green Party 1.3% 1.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 0.9% 
UKIP 1.4% 0.4% 0.1% 1.3% 3.5% 18.7% 10.6% 4.0% 
BNP 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.8% 0.7% 8.4% 1.0% 
Other 1.1% 1.4% 1.2% 1.8% 1.3% 2.2% 1.5% 1.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
N  1,804 1,660 1,820 939 2,832 1,146 808 11,009 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2010 (Clarke et al 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Vote choice by latent class membership, 2015 
  
Extreme 
Left 
Centre-
Left Centre 
Centre-
Right 
Conser-
vative 
Euro-
Sceptic 
Extreme 
Right Total 
No, did not vote 4.5% 6.0% 5.3% 8.5% 7.0% 4.0% 13.2% 6.7% 
Conservative 2.8% 22.7% 37.9% 40.0% 50.8% 39.8% 28.8% 32.9% 
Labour 54.2% 44.5% 30.3% 23.0% 23.0% 10.3% 24.1% 31.6% 
Liberal Democrat 18.3% 10.9% 14.9% 7.8% 5.7% 2.5% 1.4% 9.3% 
SNP 7.7% 7.6% 3.6% 2.4% 2.3% 1.2% 1.5% 4.2% 
Plaid Cymru 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 
Green Party 10.9% 5.9% 4.6% 1.8% 1.4% 1.3% 0.9% 3.9% 
UKIP 0.0% 0.3% 1.4% 16.0% 8.7% 39.8% 28.7% 9.9% 
BNP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 
Other 0.4% 1.5% 1.5% 0.3% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
N  943 3,601 1,816 2,321 2,033 1,020 881 12,615 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Figure 1: Unfolding analysis: UKIP in relation to other parties and voters in the latent party preference space 
2010       2015 
 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Figure 2: Frequency distributions, dependent variables 2010 and 2015 
 
 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Figure 3: Predictors of Conservative/UKIP/BNP feelings in 2010 (stand. coefficients) 
 
Note: Bars show standardized effects based on an unweighted version of the Tobit model presented in Appendix B. 
Fully shaded, non-transparent bars indicate significant effects. 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2010 (Clarke et al 2011) 
 
  
25 
 
Figure 4: Predictors of Conservative/UKIP/BNP feelings in 2015 (stand. coefficients)  
 
Note: Bars show standardized effects based on an unweighted version of the Tobit model presented in Appendix B. 
Fully shaded, non-transparent bars indicate significant effects. 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2015 (Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Figure 5: Probability of party evaluation by latent class membership, 2010 
 
Note: LCA model without covariates, seven classes, twelve binary items, 100,000 seed draws, calculated using LCA Stata plugin. 
*UDSKVKRZV5KRȡSDUDPHWHUVZKLFKDUHitem-response probabilities conditional on latent class membership. 
Model fit statistics: AIC = 33643.218; BIC =  34324.03; Entropy Raw = 1.1300089; Entropy R2 =  .99995925; Degrees of free-
dom = 4005 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Probability of party evaluation by latent class membership, 2015 
 
Note: LCA model without covariates, seven classes, twelve binary items, 100,000 seed draws, calculated using LCA Stata plugin. 
*UDSKVKRZV5KRȡSDUDPHWHUVZKLFKDUHitem-response probabilities conditional on latent class membership. 
Model fit statistics: AIC = 29834.033; BIC =  30516.181; Entropy Raw = .95711676; Entropy R2 = .99996599; Degrees of free-
dom = 4,005 
Source: British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015) 
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Appendix A. Details of variables used in multivariate analysis (Table 5; Figures 4-5 and Appen-
dices B and C). BES question numbers (2010) and variable names (2015; in italics) refer to BES 
2010 pre-election survey questionnaire (available via http://bes2009-10.org/bes-data.php) and 
BES Wave 4 2015 (available via http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-
data/).  
 2010 2015 
Age  Year of birth reversed Year of birth reversed 
Gender  Gender Gender 
Education (University degree) Dummy, based on BES q159 
(What is the highest qualifica-
tion you have?) 
Dummy, based on qeducation (What is 
the highest educational or work-related 
qualification you have?)  
Income BES q166 (Which of the fol-
lowing represents the total in-
come of your household from 
all sources before tax - includ-
ing benefits, saving and so on?) 
[16 response options, from less 
than £5,000 to more than 
£100,000) 
profile_gross_household [15 response 
options, from less than £5,000 to 
£150,000 and over] 
Intermediate occupations Dummy, based on BES q 171 
(From the following, please tell 
me which best describes the sort 
of work you do. (If not working 
now, please tell me what you 
did in your last job)) [8 catego-
ries] 
Dummy, based on ns_sec_analytic  
Routine/manual occupations As above As above 
Private sector Dummy, based on BES q175, 
(From the following, please tell 
me which type of organisation 
you do or did work for). 
n/a 
Pers. finances retrospective BES q86 (How does the finan-
cial situation of your household 
now compare with what it was 
12 months ago? 
econPersonalRetro (Now, a few ques-
tions about economic conditions. How 
does the *financial situation of your 
household* now compare with what it 
was 12 months ago?) 
Pers. finances prospective BES q88 (How do you think the 
financial situation of your 
household will change over the 
next 12 months?) 
n/a 
L-R economic outlook BES q104 (Using the 0 to 10 
scale below, where the end 
marked 0 means that govern-
ment should cut taxes a lot and 
spend much less on health and 
social services, and the end 
marked 10 means that govern-
ment should raise taxes a lot 
and spend much more on health 
and social services, where 
redistSelf (How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following state-
ments; Government should redistribute 
income from the better off to those 
who are less well off)  
28 
 
would you place yourself on 
this scale?) 
Attitude towards EU BES q103 (Overall, do you ap-
prove or disapprove of Britain's 
membership in the European 
Union?) 
eesEUIntegrationSelf2 (Some people 
feel that Britain should do all it can to 
unite fully with the European Union. 
Other people feel that Britain should 
do all it can to protect its independ-
ence from the European Union. Where 
would you place yourself on this 
scale? [from 0=Unite fully with the 
European Union to 10=Protect our in-
dependence from the European Un-
ion]) 
Authoritarianism n/a Index, based on al1 (Young people to-
day don't have enough respect for tra-
ditional British values), al2 (For some 
crimes, the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence), al3 (Schools 
should teach children to obey author-
ity) and al5 (People who break the law 
should be given stiffer sentences). 
Immigration Based on BES q26. The four 
positive items (happy, hopeful, 
confident, proud) were added 
and then the four negative items 
(angry, disgusted, uneasy, 
afraid) were subtracted, result-
ing in a scale from +4 (all four 
positive words chosen) to -4 (all 
four negative words chosen) 
Index, based on immigEcon (Do you 
think immigration is good or bad for 
Britain's economy?[scale from 1=bad 
to 7=good]) and immigCultural (Do 
you think immigration enriches or un-
dermines cultural life?[scale from 
1=undermines to 7=enriches]) 
Trust in people BES q121 (On balance, would 
\RXVD\WKDWPRVWSHRSOHFDQ¶W
be trusted or that most people 
can be trusted? Please use the 0-
10 scale to indicate your view.) 
n/a 
Satisfaction w/ democracy BES q128 (On the whole, are 
you very satisfied, fairly satis-
fied, a little dissatisfied, or very 
dissatisfied with the way that 
democracy works in this coun-
try?) 
satDemUK (On the whole, how satis-
fied or dissatisfied are you with the 
way that democracy works in...The 
UK as a whole) 
Attention to politics BES q131 (On a scale of 0 to 
10, how much attention do you 
generally pay to politics?) 
polAttention (How much attention do 
you generally pay to politics? [scale; 
0= Pay no attention;10= Pay a great 
deal of attention]) 
Religion Dummy, based on BES q163 
(Do you regard yourself as be-
longing to any particular reli-
gion?)  
Dummy, based on profile_religion 
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Daily Mail reader Dummy, based on BES q147 
(Which daily morning newspa-
per do you read most often?) 
Dummy, based on profile_newspa-
per_readership_201 (Which daily 
newspaper do you read most often?) 
Guardian reader As above As above 
Daily Star reader As above As above 
Telegraph reader As above As above 
Sun reader As above As above 
Feelings UKIP BES q 67 (On a scale that runs 
from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
strongly dislike and 10 means 
strongly like, how to you feel 
about the United Kingdom In-
dependence Party (UKIP)?) 
likeUKIP (And how much do you like 
or dislike each of the following par-
ties?...UKIP [scale from 0=strongly 
dislike to 10=strongly like]) 
Feelings BNP BES q68. As above, but about 
the British National Party 
(BNP) 
likeBNP. As above, but about 
BNP 
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Appendix B1: Tobit regression - explaining feelings towards Conservatives, UKIP and BNP, 
2010 
 Conserva-
tives Coeff. 
(SE) 
UKIP  
 Coeff. (SE) 
BNP  
 Coeff. (SE) 
Constant 3.547 (.306) -.973 (.296) -4.767 
(.509) 
Age  .004 (.002) -.014 (.002) -.036 (.004) 
Gender  .462 (.062) -.245 (.060) -.578 (.103) 
Education (Univ. degree) .206 (.071) -.146 (.068) -.788 (.122) 
Income .086 (.009) -.011 (.008) -.007 (.015) 
Intermediate occupations -.191 (.072) .203 (.070) .131 (.120) 
Routine/manual occupa-
tions 
-.680 (.085) .271 (.081) .787 (.135) 
Private sector .405 (.060) .119 (.058) .351 (.099) 
Religion .467 (.060) .090 (.057) .104 (.099) 
Pers. finances retrospec-
tive 
-.221 (.034) -.047 (.033) -.022 (.057) 
Pers. finances prospective .021 (.035) -.053 (.034) -.025 (.059) 
L-R economic outlook .340 (.015) .125 (.014) .159 (.024) 
Attitude towards EU -.350 (.027) -1.104 
(.026) 
-.969 (.044) 
Authoritarianism n/a n/a n/a 
Immigration -.254 (.021) -.276 (.020) -.786 (.036) 
Trust in people .112 (.014) .054 (.013) -.125 (.022) 
Satisfaction w/ democracy .275 (.037) .045 (.035) -.246 (.061) 
Attention to politics .048 (.013) .036 (.013) -.116 (.022) 
Daily Mail reader 1.505 (.087) .676 (.083) .674 (.138) 
Guardian reader -1.101 
(.137) 
-1.028 
(.136) 
-1.742 
(.303) 
Daily Star reader .047 (.276) .821 (.272) 2.148 (.410) 
Telegraph reader 1.659 (.126) .504 (.119) .104 (.209) 
Sun reader 1.039 (.087) .226 (.084) .730 (.134) 
Left-censored observations 1,831 2,534 6,952 
Uncensored observations 10,101 8,414 4,870 
Number of observations 11,932 10,948 11,822 
Likelihood Ratio Ȥð 3,075.49 4,345.27 3,146.22 
Prob Ȥð 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 .06 .09 .08 
Log likelihood -26,145.457 -21,453.44 -17,157.326 
Note: All four models were calculated with the tobit command in Stata, treating the dependent variable as left-censored (= con-
strained at 0). Reported are unstandardized coefficients that report impact on an unobserved latent variable that is not censored. 
All estimations use the full population weight variable for each British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 
2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015). 
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Appendix B2: Tobit regression - explaining feelings towards Conservatives, UKIP and BNP, 
2015  
 Conserva-
tives  
 Coeff. (SE) 
UKIP  
Coeff. (SE) 
BNP  
Coeff. (SE) 
Constant -4.556 (.375) 2.018 (.437) .524 (.638) 
Age  -.011 (.003) -.017 (.003) -.057 (.005) 
Gender  .048 (.077) -.775 (.090) -.250 (.134) 
Education (Univ. degree) .243 (.087) -.186 (.103) -.595 (.158) 
Income .058 (.012) -.025 (.014) -.102 (.021) 
Intermediate occupations .025 (.103) .171 (.120) -.347 (.182) 
Routine/manual occupa-
tions 
-.371 (.113) .076 (.129) .252(.186) 
Private sector n/a n/a n/a 
Religion .570 (.079) .399 (.092) .583 (.137) 
Pers. finances retrospec-
tive 
.955 (.041) .043 (.048) -.263 (.071) 
Pers. finances prospective n/a n/a n/a 
L-R economic outlook .397 (.013) .190 (.056) .089 (.023) 
Attitude towards EU -.156 (.015) -.368 (.018) -.050 (.026) 
Authoritarianism .080 (.014) .164 (.017) .172 (.026) 
Immigration -.042 (.011) -.321 (.013) -.344 (.020) 
Trust in people n/a n/a n/a 
Satisfaction w/ democracy 1.175 (.048) .083 (.056) .230 (.082) 
Attention to politics -.075 (.020) .066 (.023) -.117 (.034) 
Daily Mail reader 1.786 (.113) .905 (.130) -.138 (.194) 
Guardian reader -1.003 (.236) -1.266 
(.335) 
-1.290 
(.589) 
Daily Star reader .455 (.318) .927 (.361) 1.024 (.495) 
Telegraph reader 1.746 (.181) .976 (.209) -.239 (.337) 
Sun reader 1.236 (.103) 1.090 (.117) 1.181 (.165) 
Left-censored observations 2,378 3,311 5,996 
Uncensored observations 5,723 4,765 2,029 
Number of observations 8,101 8,076 8,025 
Likelihood Ratio Ȥð 4,495.59 3,857.65 1,388.67 
Prob Ȥð 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 .12 .11 .07 
Log likelihood -16,406.98 -14,942.896 -8,618.8625 
Note: All four models were calculated with the tobit command in Stata, treating the dependent variable as left-censored (= con-
strained at 0). Reported are unstandardized coefficients that report impact on an unobserved latent variable that is not censored. 
All estimations use the full population weight variable for each British Election Study Internet Panels 2010 and 2015 (Clarke et al 
2011, Fieldhouse et al. 2015). 
 
 
 
